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Abstract
The considerable surge in satellite constellations has brought to the fore the imperative need for an efficient
satellite constellation management plan. To address this emerging need, GMV has analyzed the possible
strategies for constellation launch, set-up, replacement of failed satellites and end-of-life policy. The
constellation launch and deployment has been divided into the launch site and launcher selection, the evaluation
of the injection and the transfer strategies, and the set-up phase. The main replacement strategies investigated are
based on in-orbit spares, spare satellites in parking orbits and spare satellites on the ground. Finally, end-of-life
policies for LEO, MEO and GEO satellites are presented. As such, the analysis accomplished encompasses most
of the fundamental phases of constellation life cycle.
A representative constellation of small satellites has been taken into account to assess the effectiveness and the
commercial viability of the strategies outlined. This study case has been handled using in-house software tools
and algorithms.
Key words: Launcher Selection, Orbit Transfer, Satellite Constellation Deployment, Constellation Replacement
Strategy, End-of-Life Policy.
Introduction
The last few years have seen a virtual explosion of
satellite constellation concepts, which have been
envisioned for a broad range of traditional and new
applications. Initially starting with navigation and
positioning implementations, constellations have
branched out into telecommunications for direct
telephony, mobile message systems and broadcasting,
as well as Earth observation and data collection
missions.  This trend in space systems has made
imperative efficient satellite constellation launch,
deployment and system management, fostering new
studies and approaches to meet the surge in
constellation developments and space transportation.
To address these emerging needs, GMV has analyzed
the possible options and trade-offs and has outlined
optimal strategies for constellation launch, set-up,
replacement of failed satellites and end-of-life policy.
The analysis of these key phases of a constellation
management plan has been carried out using in-house
software tools and algorithms6. Thi  software tool kit
combines databases, optimization procedures and
Monte Carlo simulation techniques.
The first objective of the analysis deals with the
review of the different commercial launchers in
terms of launch mass, injection orbit capabilities
(single/multiple), multiple spacecraft launch
capabilities, fairing capacity, launcher reliability and
launch delay. This information is used to select the
launcher(s) which can perform the satellite orbit
injection. The launcher selection is also strongly
affected by the launch site availability and
compatibility with the injection orbit constraints
(mainly driven by the inclination angle).
The second objective consists of the analysis of
optimal orbit injection and transfer strategies that
allow the transfer from the launcher injection orbits to
the constellation operational orbits. The possibility of
a direct injection into the final orbit has been
considered mainly in case of LEO constellations.
The third objective is the analysis and the
development of constellation set-up strategies. This
objective deals directly with the constellation set-up
procedure independent of the launcher. The ideal
purpose of the constellation deployment would be to
achieve a substantial level of service while arranging
the constellation, without having to wait for the
completion of the set-up phase. The driving concept is
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that ideally one would like to achieve some
performance level with the very first satellite
launched and to increase that level of performance
with each spacecraft launched.
To handle the set-up problem, the following primary
issues need to be addressed:
Ø What is the sequence in which the satellites
should be placed into the constellation such that
an acceptable constellation service is achieved
with a minimum number of satellites?
Ø Single, dedicated or multiple launch/launcher
strategies?
Ø How many s/c per launch should be placed?
Once a constellation launch and set-up phase has been
accomplished, the satellites are arranged in the
nominal configuration set by the constellation orbital
design. The next step within the scope of the
constellation mission analysis is related to the
evaluation of the replacement and spare strategies.
This involves estimating the consequences and the
necessary steps to take in case one or more satellites
fail to operate.
When one satellite fails to operate, the remaining
satellites are required to provide needed services at a
comparable or reduced level rather than having a total
loss of service. So, in this phase of analysis, it is
necessary to answer the following questions:
Ø What happens to the mission return and to the
overall system performance if one or more
satellites fail to operate?
Ø How to perform the satellite replacement?
¨ spare satellites in constellation?
¨ spare satellites in parking orbits?
¨ spare satellites on the ground?
Ø How to ensure the constellation configuration
maintenance?
These are important issues since most of the
constellations aim to provide the user with a
continuous reliable service or at least with a minimum
level of service.
The considerable surge in constellation developments
has also brought to the fore the imperative need of an
efficient constellation management plan. This surge is
mainly fuelled by the explosive demand for
commercial telecommunications services. This is, in
turn, leading to an escalating GEO satellite
deployment and to the introduction of
telecommunications constellations in low Earth orbit.
Several LEO constellations, encompassing well over
750 satellites, are currently in development. All these
systems will have operational lifetimes of many years
(8 to 10 years on average), and they will contribute to
a growing debris environment that already presents a
significant long-term collision hazard. Most LEO
constellations will be deployed in altitude bands of
peak debris density, thus generating a collision risk
that cannot be neglected.
The above-mentioned considerations have strongly
fostered the investigation of possible end-of-life
policies. The objective is to identify the best strategy
to be implemented at the end of the operational
lifetime of a constellation, so as to avoid a
disproportional increase in the collision risk for
satellites positioned in the same altitude band as the
constellation. Ultimately, the worst danger is the
possibility that a non-operational constellation
triggers a cascading process of collisions in its
altitud  band. Given these concerns, the identification
of effective end-of-life policies emerges as a
c ntroversial issue that plays an increasingly
important role within a constellation management
plan.
This paper presents the possible strategies to handle
constellation launch, deployment, replacement of
failed satellites and end-of-life policy. The main
effort has been devoted to define a general approach
to the problem, so as to allow the characterization of a
wide range of possible requirements and solutions.
The concepts and the requirements emerging from the
investigative study have been applied to a
representative constellation of small satellites, so as to
assess the commercial viability of the strategies
outlined. GMV performed the analysis of the launch,
set-up, replacement and end-of-life strategies for a
Data Collection Constellation for an ESA-ESTEC
contract, in collaboration with Alcatel Space
Industries (prime contractor).
Launch and Set-up Strategy
Considering the launching and the constellation set-
up experience gained by the NAVSTAR/GPS
constellation and the recently launched ORBCOMM
and Iridium systems, one can clearly identify that the
constellation launch and deployment procedures are
driving factors for the constellation service. The set-
up strategy and the associated launcher selection are
directly related to the investment plan and to the
revenues. They become significant only when a
sufficient number of satellites is in orbit and a suitable
market penetration is achieved. In this strategic
planning some of the key factors are the launcher
selection, the deployment cost and the launch service
availability and completeness.
Launch Strategy
In investigating the launch strategy and set-up, one of
the first decisions to be made is which launcher(s) to
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use and how many satellites that launcher can inject
into orbit. Of primary importance in determining the
launcher(s), is the number of satellites which can be
launched with a particular launcher. This number
depends primarily on two factors:
¨ The payload mass which the launcher can inject
into the desired orbit
¨ The volume of the launcher fairing
In order for a launcher to be able to launch a satellite,
it must be able to inject the mass of the satellite into
its desired orbit (this may be either directly or via a
transfer orbit) and the satellite(s) must be able to fit
inside the launcher fairing.
The possible launchers which may be used to launch a
given satellite are highly dependent on the launch site
which is used. Therefore the launch site selection
represents a key phase in the launch process. The list
of possible launch sites for a specific mission can be
obtained based on the desired orbit inclination (which
is the driving parameter). The possible launch sites
are then passed to the launcher selection phase in
order to immediately eliminate launchers which
cannot be launched from one of these launch sites.
Using this information, the following step entails
identifying possible launchers based on the satellite
mass, orbit altitude, eccentricity, orbit inclination
angle, and optionally the satellite dimensions (length,
width and height) and launcher adaptor mass. At this
point it is possible to estimate the number of satellites
which can be launched with the selected launcher(s),
as well as information about the launcher(s).
In order to deal with the launch strategy, three
databases have been compiled:
¨ Launch Site Database: it provides information as
for the launch site location and the possible
inclination angles to inject into from each launch
site.
¨ Launcher Database: it contains the company
name, launch sites, mass which can be launched
to GTO, mass which can be directly injected into
GEO (if possible), launch cost in millions of $US,
dedicated time-to-launch, and the launcher
reliability. There are a total of 28 launchers in the
database. They are:
Ø Ariane 40, Ariane 42L, Ariane 42P, Ariane
44L, Ariane 44LP, and Ariane 44P
Ø Ariane 5
Ø Athena 1 and Athena 2
Ø Atlas IIAS
Ø Delta II and Delta III
Ø Long March CZ-2C, Long March CZ-2E,
Long March CZ-3, Long March CZ-3A, and
Long March CZ-4
Ø Pegasus XL
Ø Soyuz
Ø Proton D-1 and Proton D-1-e
Ø Rockot
Ø Taurus
Ø Titan II, Titan III and Titan IV
Ø Zenit 2 and Zenit 3.
In addition, launcher performance profiles have been
determined for injections into LEO orbits. These
profiles describe the mass injection capability as
function of the altitude and inclination of the injection
orbit.
¨ Fairing Database: it details the model type, the
dimensions and the volume of each fairing for
ach launcher.
The following flow chart schematically shows which
are the main steps to be performed so as to select a
launcher to launch a particular satellite or
constellation.
1. Define Mission Requirements
2. Define Constellation and Payload Requirements
3. Political Considerations: where to launch the
satellite from, using what launch vehicle
4. Launch Site Selection: identify possible launch
sites based on the inclination of the target orbit
5. Launcher-Spacecraft Fit
6. Mass and fairing dimensions
7. Constraint Analysis and Optimization with
respect to: launch site, cost, reliability,
availability, launcher-spacecraft interfaces,
launch opportunities
8. Determination of Candidate Launchers
9. Transfer Strategy necessary from the launcher
injection orbit to the operative orbits? If so,
evaluate the required fuel budget, a d i  to the
mass of the spacecraft, and start the analysis all
over again.
10. Launcher Selection: possible launchers and
number of satellites that each can inject into the
target orbit.
It is to be noted that trying to cope with all the
political factors involved in the selection of launch
site and launcher was beyond the scope of the
analysis. It was therefore decided to present all of the
possible launch sites and launchers and allow the
mission analyst to eliminate politically undesirable
options at the end.
The launcher survey performed also pointed out that,
among the launchers reviewed, only Ariane 5 and
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Rockot are capable of launching into different planes.
But only a very small angular difference can be
achieved between two injection planes in terms of
right ascension of the ascending node and inclination.
Thus, GMV has assumed that no substantial multiple
plane insertion capability is available at the moment
and that each launch is targeted to inject all the
spacecraft lofted atop the launcher into the same
orbital plane. This assumption reflects the state-of-
the-art technology in the launch vehicle industry and
can be dropped if multiple plane insertion capability
becomes feasible.
Study Case
In order to test the effectiveness of the launch and set-
up strategy outlined, a Data Collection Mission10 ha
been taken into account as representative study case
as for constellations of small satellites. The overall
mission objective is to gather a wide range of
information, elaborate it as required and deliver either
the processed or the raw data to the users in a non-
synchronous data relay mode.
The primary target area is located at low to mid
latitudes in the northern hemisphere (26°-57°), since
it is expected that the largest demand, in terms of
volume of data to be managed, stems from the highly
populated and industrializes areas of the world. In
order to meet the requirements expressed in terms of
mean revisit time in the areas of interest, the design
solution is a Walker constellation of 24 satellites
symmetrically arranged in 6 orbital planes that are
evenly distributed around the equator. The
constellation inclination is 57° and the altitude is 850
km. This configuration allows achieving a mean
revisit time lower than 3 minutes with a minimum
elevation angle larger than 5°.
The spacecraft used to carry out the mission has a dry
mass of 130 kg and a cubic structural configuration,
with equal dimensions of 0.8 m. In order to arrange
the spacecraft inside the launcher, a proper structural
interface is required: the adaptor. As reasonable
value, we have assumed that the adaptor mass is 15%
of the spacecraft dry mass.
Table 1 presents the most interesting launch vehicles
resulting from the selection phase, complete with the
relevant information about them. Based on the
fundamental assumption that no multiple plane
insertion capability is feasible, the most interesting
possibilities for a direct injection are the launchers
that can inject up to four satellites per launch.
No launcher seems to be suitable to launch exactly
four satellites at a time, so as to fill a constellation
plane with a launch. However, Taurus can launch five
spacecraft and can be used to inject four if necessary.
Among the possible launchers obtained, Athena 1,
Pegasus XL and Taurus can be classified as relatively
small launchers, which are suitable to inject small
payloads into LEO. One observation inferred from the
table presented is that the cost per spacecraft launched
is rather high if these small launchers are used to
inject the satellites. Currently, the small launcher
suppliers are supporting a development plan aimed at
cost reduction in order to make their vehicles more
attractive and competitive, particularly for deploying
the emerging small satellite systems.
Table 1: Selected Launchers for the Data Collection Mission (Launcher data up to May 1999).
Launcher Launch Site Fairing
Volume (m3)
Mass
(kg)
S/c per
launcher
Launcher
Cost ($M)
Cost per
s/c ($M)
Launcher
Reliability
Athena 1 Cape Canaveral,
Vandenberg
10.53 391. 2 16 8 50%:
1/2lnchs
Athena 2 Cape Canaveral,
Vandenberg
29.00 1322. 8 21 2 80%:
4/5lnchs
Long March
CZ-2C
Jiuquan 26.75 499. 3 15-20 5-6 85%
Pegasus XL L-1011
Airplane
2.00 250. 1 6-15 6-15 86%: 18/21
lnchs
Rockot Baikonur,
Plesetsk
24.18 1353. 9 13-15 1 100%: 3/3
lnchs
Taurus Cape Canaveral,
Vandenberg
4.74 900. 5 18-20 3-4 New
launcher
From the evaluation of the possible launchers for the
Data Collection Mission it emerges that the number
of choices is narrowed down when the deployment of
a constellation of small LEO satellites is taken into
account. The most powerful launchers, which have a
considerable mass injection capability, do not prove
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to be advantageous possibilities because they can
launch a considerable number of spacecraft into an
injection plane (sometimes more than the number of
satellites in the whole constellation).
Taking into account only cost considerations, Rockot
and Athena 2 emerge as the most advantageous
choices (lowest cost per s/c launched). These launch
vehicles can inject more than four satellites per
launch, so they are considered very good options for
an indirect injection, which allows populating various
operational orbital planes with a launch.
It is important to underline that the suggested
launchers are intended to be used by the mission
analyst as guidelines for the evaluation of the launch
and deployment strategies. The values of the launcher
data displayed are approximations only, and for more
precise and detailed information the launcher
manufacturer should be consulted.
Orbit Injection and Transfer Strategies
A direct injection of the satellites into the final orbits
of the constellation is conducive to carrying out a
quick deployment strategy. This allows starting the
system operations and revenue stream early in the
management plan. The combination of final orbit
altitude and inclination, along with launcher
capability, determines the feasibility of this injection
strategy.
The launch vehicle may require an upper stage to
achieve the final orbit, adding to the launch cost. The
alternative is to provide sufficient propulsive
capability on the spacecraft to perform the propulsive
maneuvers needed to reach the final orbit. The impact
on the spacecraft in additional propellant and tanks
must be carefully weighed in terms of cost and
complexity of the spacecraft design and traded against
the potentially higher launch cost associated with an
upper stage.
Another option is an indirect injection: the altitude of
the injection orbit is lower than the operational one
and the differential effect of the Earth oblateness on
the node (due to the altitude difference) can be used
to change the node of the satellites and populate
several operational orbital planes.
An indirect injection strategy proves to be useful
particularly if the launcher selected to perform the
orbit injection is capable of launching a number of
satellites greater than the number of spacecraft in
each of the constellation orbital planes. In this case,
the satellites can be launched into a drifting orbit and
transferred to their target orbit when the drifting plane
and the target plane overlap. The transfer maneuver to
be accomplished depends on the propulsion system
used. In case of high thrust propulsion systems, the
orbit transfer can be considered impulsive and a
transfer maneuver can be performed each time the
drifting plane crosses one of the target planes of the
constellation. In case of low thrust propulsion
systems, the transfer maneuver should start before the
drift plane crosses the target plane. Since the
maneuver cannot be considered impulsive, it is
necessary to account for the rotation of the two planes
during the raising phase.
Independent of the strategy applied, the orbit transfer
must be optimized by taking into account such criteria
s the DV required (i.e. the necessary fuel budget)
and/or the transfer time, and trying to minimize them.
Orbit Transfer Methods
Two methods have been analyzed to perform the orbit
t ansfer: the Impulsive Orbit Transfer and the Orbit
Transfer based on J2-Angular-Drift. The basic
difference between these two methods consists of the
propellant and time resource allocation.
¨ In the impulsive orbit transfer th  orbit transfer is
carried out by using a sequence of impulsive
maneuvers, each characterized by a value of the
corresponding DV required. In-plane as well as
out-of-plane maneuvers are implemented.
¨ The orbit transfer based on J2-angular-drift
takes advantage of the secular drift of the right
ascension of ascending node (RAAN) due to the
J2-term of the terrestrial gravitational potential.
This effect is used to create a relative precession
motion between two orbital planes so as to obtain
the desired RAAN separation.
The basic assumption for the orbit transfer based on
J2-angular-drift is that the initial (drift) orbit and the
final (target) orbit have the same plane inclination.
Because of this and since the initial difference of
RAAN is cancelled thanks to the differential drift,
only in-plane impulsive maneuvers are necessary to
perform the orbit transfer. An optimal low-cost
Hohmann transfer is applied once the drift time has
elapsed and the two orbital planes have the same
RAAN. One-impulse transfer and two-impulse
transfer strategies are considered to perform the in-
plane maneuvers.
In case of chemical propulsion, the in-plane transfer
phase between the drift orbit and the final orbit is
small compared to the drift duration (the time on the
drift orbit). Therefore, the overall transfer duration is
assumed equal to the drift duration. On the other
hand, if an electric propulsion system is used, the
transfer phase between the drift orbit and the final
orbit cannot be neglected, since it represents a
significant part of the total transfer duration.
In the most general case, the semi-major axis and the
eccentricity of the drift orbit are the keplerian
elements that affect its node precession and are the
parameters to be determined. A constraint on the
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maximum transfer time can be imposed and the
corresponding DV can be computed.
This transfer strategy is conducive to saving the fuel
allocated to the orbit transfers, since it allows
avoiding out-of-plane maneuvers that are generally
very expensive. On the other hand, the duration of the
overall transfer phase turns out to be longer than in
the case of a transfer strategy based on totally
propulsive maneuvers. Thus, the propellant
consumption must be traded against the overall
transfer time.
Study Case
In principle, it is reasonable to assume that a direct
injection into the final orbits of the Data Collection
Constellation is feasible. In any case, to evaluate the
impact of a propulsive maneuver in terms of
propellant mass required (and hence additional mass
of the spacecraft to be lofted atop the launcher), GMV
has calculated the cost of the impulsive transfer from
the injection orbit of the launcher to the final orbits of
the constellation.
The altitude of the injection orbit is varied and the
propellant mass required for the optimal two-impulse
transfer maneuver is computed. The launcher
injection orbit is assumed to be circular, with the
same inclination angle as the constellation. Thus, the
transfer maneuver is devoted only to increase the
orbi  altitude.  The propulsion system is chemical,
with a specific impulse of 280 s. The results are
presented in a graphical format in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Propellant Mass for the Impulsive Transfer
to the Data Collection Orbit
In order to evaluate if any advantage is achieved
thanks to a propulsive transfer from a low launcher
injection orbit to the orbit altitude of the constellation,
GMV has assumed a circular injection orbit at 200 km
(a very common LEO injection) and has calculated
the necessary propellant to raise the altitude. This
a ditional propellant mass has been added to the
spacecraft and the launcher selection process has been
i vestigated again, this time using an increased value
for the satellite mass to be launched. The results are
presented in Table 2.
Table 2: Comparison of Injection Strategies for the Data Collection Mission.
Direct injection into 850 km Injection into 200 km (followed by an altitude-
raising phase)
1 s/c launched Pegasus XL
 6-15 $M per s/c launched
Pegasus XL*
6-15 $M per s/c launched
2 s/c launched Athena 1
8 $M per s/c launched
Pegasus XL
3-7 $M per s/c launched
3 s/c launched Long March CZ-2C
5-6 $M per s/c launched
Athena 1
5 $M per s/c launched
4 s/c launched Taurus **
4-5 $M per s/c launched
Taurus **
4-5 $M per s/c launched
8 s/c launched
Athena 2
2 $M per s/c launched
Rockot ***
1 $M per s/c launched
Athena 2***
2 $M per s/c launched
Rockot ***
1 $M per s/c launched
*Can launch 2 s/c, but is used to launch 1 s/c.                      ** Can launch 5 s/c, but is used to launch 4 s/c.
*** Can launch 9 s/c, but is used to launch 8 s/c.
The potential advantage of this injection strategy with
respect to a direct injection is that some of the
launchers selected (particularly Athena 1 and Pegasus
XL) increase their mass injection capability. This
entails a potential reduction in the launch cost. In any
case, the significance of the potential cost reduction is
not so high as to lead to the rejection of a direct
injection strategy. Undoubtedly, a direct injection is
still a very good option.
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The feasibility and the cost of an indirect injection
strategy can be estimated using the angular drift due
to J2 to assist the transfer to the orbital planes of the
constellation.
Figure 2 presents the node precession due to the
Earth’s oblateness versus the circular orbit altitude.
The inclinations selected to parameterize the curves
are close to the value of the study case under
consideration. The determination of the drift orbit
entails the evaluation of its altitude so as to fulfill the
mission requirements, particularly in terms of the
overall transfer time.
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Figure 2: Node precession due to the Earth’s
oblateness versus the circular orbit altitude 
The worst case as for the indirect injection occurs
when the initial angular difference between the
injection plane and the target plane is equal to the
spacing between two constellation planes. Table 3
provides the drift orbit that meets the constraint in
terms of the specified drift duration.
Table 3: Indirect Injection of the Data Collection S/c.
Drift Time
(months)
Circular Drift Orbit
Altitude (km)
Propellant
Mass (kg)
2 349.5 18.6
3 499.0 12.5
4 579.6 9.5
5 630.1 7.6
6 664.7 6.3
The indirect injection technique can be an interesting
solution if the constellation launch and deployment is
carried out using launch vehicles that can inject more
than four spacecraft into the desired orbit (e.g. Athena
2, Rockot). These vehicles allow reducing the cost per
satellite launched with respect to the launchers
selected for a direct injection (Athena 1, Long March
CZ-2C, Pegasus XL or Taurus).
Constellation Set-up Strategy
Intermediate Deployments
The need to start the revenue stream flowing as early
as possible is a driving force acting upon both the
system design and the development schedule. This
feature is evident particularly in today’s
telecommunications satellite systems.
Ear  observation constellations generally start data
acquisition as soon as sufficient satellites are
deployed and operational. The data quality and
delivery time provided by a partially deployed Earth
observation constellation are coarser than the nominal
ones, which can be achieved only when the whole
system achieves the full operational status.
In case of navigation and positioning constellations,
the deployment strategy varies widely and the
constellation typically does not function until all the
spacecraft are operational. So, intermediate system
arrangements are not generally dealt with.
A considerable interest in partial deployment options
arises if we consider the telecommunications
constellations that are in a development status. The
GEO community is accustomed to launching a single
satellite and starting the revenue stream shortly after
the system checkout phase has ended. The revenue
stream from the market area served by this first
satellite can then be used to self-fund any additional
GEO satellites called for by the constellation set-up
plan. The LEO (or MEO) system dynamics do not
allow the same revenue results after the launch of
their first satellite, thus forcing the constellation
designers to investigate partial deployment options
that can achieve a significant service.
The evaluation of the possible partial deployment
options proves to be very useful particularly in case of
symmetric, inclined constellations (also referred to as
“Walker Constellations”), and it allows identifying
progressive deployment steps to be traced in the
system set-up phase.
A major difference between the inclined and the polar
constellations emerges when we investigate the
feasibility of intermediate deployments. Polar orbit,
single coverage systems must have all satellites or
almost all satellites arranged in orbit before
continuous service can be provided to customers in
moderate latitude bands. This is due to the fact that
polar systems are capable of providing the best
coverage performance at high latitudes, in concentric
rings around the poles. The poles turn out to be the
only geographic region where continuous coverage
may be achieved soon. Unfortunately, this region is
not usually the primary service area in the system’s
business plan. Therefore, the choices for early
revenues available to systems employing polar orbits
are limited. The solution that is currently being put
SSC99-X-1
8
Stefania Cornara                                                                 13th Annual AIAA/USU Conference on Small Satellites
forward consists of a rapid deployment campaign.
This solution attempts to place the constellation into
space via a multi-satellite per launch vehicle strategy
carried out within a very short time schedule.
Inclined orbit constellations have at least one more
deployment choice available to them. They may be
capable of providing continuous service to bands of
latitude near the maximum and minimum latitudes of
the satellite ground track by deploying only a portion
of their full system. This partially deployed
constellation could then begin early revenue
operations while the remaining planes of the full
constellations are populated.
In the attempt to outline a methodology to identify
possible intermediate constellations, some criteria
have been defined to select the most significant
partial deployment options. These criteria are
intended to define the compatibility of a partial
deployment solution with the configuration of the
constellation that must be set up (the full
constellation). The following criteria of selection are
applied to identify an intermediate constellation:
- the number of orbital planes of the intermediate
constellation must be less than the number of
orbital planes of the full constellation
- the number of s/c per plane must be less than the
number of s/c per plane of the full constellation.
These criteria have been chosen because they are
conducive to avoiding plane changes to evolve from
the intermediate solution(s) to the final configuration
of the constellation. Moving a satellite from an orbit
plane to another is an expensive maneuver in terms of
impulse and hence of propellant. So it is quite
desirable to avoid a system evolution strategy that
entails out-of-plane maneuvers. Because of this, plane
changes are not envisaged and the above criteria are
used to identify intermediate deployment options.
It is to be noted that this procedure allows identifying
the main steps of progressive deployment. We cannot
rule out that other intermediate steps may prove to be
interesting and need to be analyzed in more depth.
Constellation Set-up
The ideal purpose of the constellation deployment
would be to achieve a substantial level of service
while arranging the constellation, without having to
wait for the completion of the set-up phase. The
driving concept is that ideally one would like to
achieve some performance level with the very first
satellite launched and to increase that level of
performance with each spacecraft launched. Some
analyses have shown that the constellation
performance tends to come in plateaus as one inserts
one more satellite into each orbit plane of the final
constellation. For this reason, constellations with a
small number of orbit planes have an advantage in
terms of performance build-up over many-planed
ones. On the other hand, a smaller number of orbital
planes leads to lower degradation. This means, for
example, that in a constellation of ten satellites
arranged in two planes, if one satellite is lost, by re-
phasing the constellation (with little propellant
consumption), the performance can be maintained
with the level corresponding to an eight-satellite
plateau.
To handle the set-up problem, the primary issues to
be addressed are the following:
Ø What is the sequence in which the satellites
should be placed into the constellation such that
an acceptable constellation service is achieved
with a minimum number of satellites?
Ø Single, dedicated or multiple launch/launcher
strategies?
Ø How many s/c per launch should be placed?
Although the set-up problem can be formulated and
handled independent of the launcher(s) selected to
perform the satellite orbit injection, obviously there is
a correlation between the launcher selection phase
and the deployment strategy. The fundamental
correlation parameter is the number of spacecraft
launched per launch, which depends on the
launcher(s) used. Once a launcher has been selected
and its mass and injection orbit capabilities have been
assessed, we know the number of satellites that it can
load a d launch. This number is the input needed to
develop the deployment procedure, which allows
bypa sing the explicit definition of the launcher used.
In addition, the launcher also drives other important
factors, such as the launch cost, the time delay to
launch and the launch system reliability.
It is interesting to point out that, since the deployment
problem and the launcher selection have been
uncoupled, it is possible to change the “logic
sequence” of application of the two phases. The
mission analyst could cope with the set-up strategy
and determine one or more optimal deployment
sequences, with the corresponding number of
spacecraft launched at each set-up step. Then, the
analyst should evaluate if the state-of-the-art launch
industry can provide the lift-off capability to carry out
the deployment sequence determined and if the
suitable launchers are available. This approach
reverses the normal evolution of the launch and set-up
procedure as it has been conceived up to now, which
probably involves an intrinsic difficulty of
implementation. On the other hand, to face the
constellation launch and set-up problem using a
different perspective could be conducive to
identifying new needs as for the launcher capabilities
and potential “gaps” to be filled in the launcher
provider market.
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Also the identification of some intermediate
constellations can affect the set-up procedure:
keeping in mind the progressive deployments
determined, the analyst can try to target the sequence
of launches aimed at filling the constellation planes to
achieving an intermediate constellation at some
deployment step.
To handle the intricate scenario of constellation set-
up, it has been necessary to find an efficient
formulation of the problem and to model the
resolution methodology. To achieve this objective
some assumptions and simplifications have been
used. The fundamental assumption is that no multiple
plane insertion capability is taken into account. This
means that each launch is targeted to inject all the
spacecraft lofted atop the launcher into the same
orbital plane.
At the first-order level, the coverage performance can
be considered as a general indicator of the service
availability provided by the satellite system. The
coverage performance in the selected region of
primary interest is the figure of merit to assess the
service capability of the system at each set-up step.
Study Case
The first step to cope with in the process of deploying
a symmetric inclined constellation (like the Data
Collection Constellation) is the exploration of
potential intermediate deployment options. GMV has
analyzed the partial deployments which allow
achieving a certain service level in the primary area of
interest, that is, the latitude band between 26° and 57°
north. The mean revisit time in this latitude band is
used as the figure of merit to test the quality of the
intermediate constellations determined. Table 4 lists
the main intermediate constellations identified while
tracing the evolution of the system during the set-up
phase.
Table 4: Intermediate Deployment Options for the
Data Collection Constellation
Total
number of
s/c
Number of
planes
Phasing
parameter
Mean
revisit time
(min)
6 2 0 28.3
8 2 1 18.3
12 3 2 11.9
12 6 3 8.2
16 4 3 6.5
24 6 1 2.5
Each intermediate constellation is a Walker
constellation identified by the total number of
satellites (T), the number of the orbital planes and the
phasi g parameter (F). The relative spacing between
satellites in adjacent planes is equal to F*(360 deg/T).
A criterion which can be used to select one or more
partial deployments among the ones obtained is the
mean revisit time that they provide. It is up to the
analyst to decide if a degraded coverage performance
is acceptable and, if so, which level of degradation is
compatible with the mission requirements.
Populating the Data Collection Constellation with
satellites involves carrying out a methodical sequence
of launches into designated orbital planes.  GMV has
evaluated the optimal set-up strategy trying to trace
the progressive deployments determined.
Three possible strategies are taken into account to
deploy the constellation: the main steps of these set-
up procedures coincide with the intermediate
deployments outlined. The relevant information
concerning each set-up strategy is presented in Table
5, Table 6 and Table 7, so as to allow comparing them
in a straightforward way. The launches highlighted
correspond to the achievement of one of the
intermediate deployments identified. The number of
satellites deployed after each set-up step is the sum of
the satellites launched up to the last launch inclusive.
In these three tables a column indicates the coverage
performance achieved at each set-up step, that is, after
eac  launch. The evolution of the coverage
performance during the deployment phase provides
the c verage performance profile. The geographic
coverage of the satellite system in the primary area of
intere t has been simulated over a period of 24 hours.
The mean percentage of coverage over the whole
simulation period is used as the fundamental figure of
merit to test the service availability at each set-up
s ep.
The coverage performance profile is basically the
same for the set-up procedures analyzed. The
deployment of the full 24-s/c constellation provides
coverage of 94% of the selected latitude band on
average. A total of respectively eight, six and seven
launches were necessary to accomplish the
constellation deployment by implementing these
procedures. If the need to start the operational phase
of the system and the revenue stream is a primary
factor to determine the success of the mission, then
the second strategy should be implemented. In fact,
this is the fastest deployment, which involves the
lowest number of launches.
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Table 5: First set-up strategy for the Data Collection Constellation.
Launch
number
Number of s/c
launched per launch
Launcher used Launcher
cost ($M)
Coverage
performance (%)
1 3 Long March CZ-2C 15-20 15.3587
2* 3 Long March CZ-2C 15-20
30.7116 6 s/c in 2 planes
3 4 Taurus 18-20
48.2016
4 1 Pegasus XL 6-15
49.3200
5* 1 Pegasus XL 6-15
56.0083 12 s/c in 3 planes
6* 4 Taurus 18-20
71.2554 16 s/c in 4 planes
7 4 Taurus 18-20
83.2483
8* 4 Taurus 18-20
94.1819 24 s/c in 6 planes
* Denotes intermediate constellation as described in Table 4
Table 6: Second set-up strategy for the Data Collection Constellation
Launch
number
Number of s/c
launched per launch
Launcher used Launcher
cost ($M)
Coverage
performance (%)
1 4 Taurus 18-20 20.4945
2* 4 Taurus 18-20
39.9056 8 s/c in 2 planes
3* 4 Taurus 18-20
56.1753 12 s/c in 3 planes
4* 4 Taurus 18-20
71.2554 16 s/c in 4 planes
5 4 Taurus 18-20
83.2483
6* 4 Taurus 18-20
94.1819 24 s/c in 4 planes
* Denotes intermediate constellation as described in Table 4
Table 7: Third set-up strategy for the Data Collection Constellation
Launch
number
Number of s/c
launched per launch
Launcher used Launcher
cost ($M)
Coverage
performance (%)
1 4 Taurus 18-20 20.4945
2* 2 Athena 1 16
30.2126 6 s/c in 2 planes
3 4 Taurus 18-20
48.0366
4* 2 Athena 1 16
56.1753 12 s/c in 3 planes
5* 4 Taurus 18-20
71.2554 16 s/c in 4 planes
6 4 Taurus 18-20
83.2483
7* 4 Taurus 18-20
94.1918 24 s/c in 6 planes
* Denotes intermediate constellation as described in Table 4
The average cost of the set-up strategies taken into
account is estimated in Figure 3. It emerges that the
second strategy, besides being the fastest, also
involves the minimum total deployment cost.
Therefore, it seems quite reasonable to select this
strategy to set up the Data Collection Constellation.
It should be noted that the values of launch cost are
approximations based on US Department of
Transportation estimates or provided by the launcher
manufacturers. These values are estimates only and
may vary significantly depending on the mission.
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Figure 3: Average Set-up Cost for the Data
Collection Constellation.
Conclusions for the Launch and Set-up Strategy
The analysis of the constellation launch and
deployment strategies has been divided into the
following investigation phases:
Ø Evaluation of the launch strategy (launch site
selection and launcher selection)
Ø Evaluation of the injection and the transfer
strategies
Ø Constellation set-up strategy.
It is unquestionable that the launch and deployment
phase is a crucial step in achieving the full operational
status of a constellation and plays an important role in
the investment plan. The operational satellites must
be deployed on schedule to catch the market, while
trying to keep the launch cost, a significant portion of
the overall system cost, to its lowest value.
On the basis of these considerations, the problem of
deploying a satellite constellation has been tackled
using a multi-criteria approach. The launch cost, the
deployment duration and the service availability of
the system emerged as the main factors which
combine to determine the effectiveness of a set-up
strategy.
The use of heavy lift vehicles to launch satellite
constellations offers the potential advantage of
reducing the deployment duration and the launch cost
per satellite, thanks to the injection of multiple
spacecraft per launch. On the other hand, in case of
constellations of small LEO satellites, in some
circumstances the big launchers may not be the most
advantageous choice. Their mass injection capability,
particularly targeted to heavy payloads and/or high
orbits, cannot be used completely and in an effective
way. These launchers are capable of launching an
enormous number of small satellites into LEO orbits
(sometimes more satellites that those of the whole
constellation), which may not be a very interesting
option unless a substantial multiple plane injection
capability is made feasible. Small launchers can be
more attractive to deploy LEO constellations of small
satellites. The main drawback is that small launchers
generally entail a rather high cost per s/c launched.
These observations seem to outline a “gap” in the
launch capabilities provided by the state-of-the-art
launch vehicle industry. The reduction of the launch
cost and the development of a flexible injection
capability could be a solution to fill this gap. The
surge in space transportation demand is actually
urging the launcher providers to enhance the
capabilities of the existing vehicles and to develop
new launchers to meet the emerging needs.
Replacement and Spare Strategy
Spare Policy Strategies.
Intrinsic Robustness to Satellite Failures
For some constellations, such as those providing
telecommunications (e.g. Iridium, Teledesic,
Globalstar) or navigation (e.g. GPS, GLONASS,
GNSS) services, in order to avoid any deterioration of
the service provided to the users, the constellation is
designed to be "overpopulated". This means that the
system is endowed with "spare" satellites already
orbiting within the constellation.
Two main overpopulated configurations have been
already implemented or are envisaged by the
designers of the constellations that are in a
development status:
- Overpopulated by One Satellite. The
constellation designers purposely add one extra
operational satellite per plane to the constellation,
so that, if a satellite failure occurs, there is no
time delay to replace the failed satellite. The
constellation continues to function without
interruption at maximum capacity with one
satellite failure in an orbital plane.
Telecommunications constellations are
sometimes overpopulated by one satellite in order
to provide redundancy in the system (i.e.
Teledesic).
- Overpopulation by Two Satellites. In cases where
the reliability and availability of the constellation
are crucial, the constellation designers may
overpopulate the constellation by two satellites
per plane. This assures a service availability and
reliability in over 99.99% of all situations. The
reliability and availability of the constellation are
only interrupted if there are three or more failures
in the same plane at one time. This option is
usually selected by navigation constellations (i.e.
GPS and GLONASS) for whom reliability and
availability of the signal are paramount.
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In-orbit Spares
Other constellations allow that during a reduced
period the constellation service may be "degraded" to
a lower performance level. One can thus envisage that
the constellation is functioning with a reduced
number of in-orbit "spare" satellites.
The spare satellites are not exactly placed at the
operational altitude of the constellation in order to
avoid possible collisions of the non-controlled spares
with the operational spacecraft. The slight difference
in altitude implies a different inclination between the
orbital planes of the spare and the operational
satellites to counter-act the differential perturbations
due to the Earth gravitational field and keep the nodes
of the orbits to the same value.
To put a spare satellite into the right orbital slot, two
Hohmann transfers can be performed, so as to re-
acquire the nominal performance level. A first one to
reach a phasing orbit and a second one to come back
to the operational altitude. The phasing orbit is
generally a circular orbit at a different altitude with
respect to the constellation, so as to eliminate the
phase difference between the spare and the
operational satellites.
The time to replace a failed satellite by this method is
usually on the order of few days (generally one or
two). The cost drivers are at least the number of spare
satellites, the repositioning DV (total and per
satellite), the required time and the performance level.
Telecommunications constellations frequently use
this strategy to replace failed satellites (i.e.
Globalstar).
Spare Satellites in Parking Orbits
Another option consists in assuming that the "spare"
satellites are orbiting in "parking" orbits. The
constraints on such orbits are among others:
- the required DV to transfer from the parking orbit
to any orbital plane of the constellation,
- the DV required for the satellite repositioning
inside the constellation,
- the time delay between a satellite failure and the
constellation orbital recovery.
The time to replace a failed satellite by this method is
usually on the order of one to two months.
Telecommunications constellations usually use either
this strategy or in-orbit spares to replace failed
spacecraft (i.e. Iridium).
Spare Satellites on the Ground
The last option consists in keeping one or more
"spare" satellites of the constellation on the ground. If
we select a launch-on-demand as the replacement
strategy, there are two possible options.  Either a
spacecraft is assumed to be stored on the ground and
then launched as soon as the operator is able to secure
a launcher for it. Or, the operator is able to
manufacture a spacecraft quickly enough and secure a
launch for it in order to replace the failed satellite.
Earth observation constellations sometimes use this
s rategy. Other types of constellations will sometimes
use this strategy as a back-up to their primary
replac ment strategy (i.e. Globalstar which has on-
orbit spares and ground spares which can be launched
on demand).
This r placement strategy involves launching a spare
sat llite to replace a failed satellite only when the
failure has occurred. Two conditions are mandatory to
pu forward this policy as feasible for a given
mission: there must be a launcher with the capacity of
carrying a single satellite in terms of mass and
volume, and it is necessary an agreement between a
launcher provider and the organism operating the
constellation to ensure launch priority and
availability. Because of these considerations, the time
to replace a failed satellite by a launch on-demand is
usually on the order of months up to one year.
Driving Parameters
The driving factors that determine the selection of a
particular spare strategy are the service availability
provided by the system and the satellite reliability
over the constellation lifetime.
The reliability figure of a complex product like a
satellite can be modeled using a function, R(t), which
expresses the probability that the spacecraft is
functioning in nominal conditions during a given time
interval. R(t) can be computed using this equation:
                     R(t) = e(-t/MTBF)                                     (1)
R(t) is the reliability at time t and MTBF is the Mean
Time Between Failures for the satellite. Given the
value of the end-of-life reliability and the lifetime of
the constellation, the MTBF can be computed and
then the above equation can be used to evaluate the
satellite reliability at each instant of time.
Taking into account the fact that no satellite has 100%
reliability, the redundancy of the system should be
optimized, either at the satellite level (i.e. satellite
reliability, which involves higher manufacturing
costs) or at the constellation level (i.e. multiple
coverage). A trade-off between the satellite reliability
and the level of constellation redundancy is to be
accomplished versus the service availability required.
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The performance level of the satellite system can be
defined as the capability to meet the mission
requirements, according to the mission profile.
Performance parameters can be the geographic
coverage, the mean or the maximum revisit time, etc.
Based on this definition, the performance level
achieved within a certain Mean Time To Replace
(MTTR) proves to be a good indicator of the system
service availability over the system lifetime. The
nominal configuration of the constellation is designed
specifically to fulfill the mission objectives and
constraints. This means that a system that operates in
the nominal status provides 100% performance level.
When one or more satellite failures occur, we can
expect that during a reduced period of time the
constellation service may be "degraded" to a lower
performance level, unless the constellation is
overpopulated.
In order to estimate the evolution of the performance
level over the system lifetime, first of all it is
necessary to evaluate the instantaneous degradation of
the performance level due to one or more satellite
failures. To achieve this objective, we can simulate
the failure of one, two and three satellites at the same
time and calculate the performance level of the
degraded configuration of the constellation. Note that
the occurrence of three failures at the same time is a
pessimistic condition, unless the number of satellites
in the constellation is very high. The simulations of
satellite failures must be enough to explore all the
possible situations (for example, failures in the same
orbital plane or in different orbital planes) and to
allow averaging the values of the performance levels
obtained. At the end of these simulations, we have
computed the average performance levels with one,
two and three simultaneous satellite failures.
Given these instantaneous performance levels, a
Monte Carlo simulation is applied to calculate the
mean performance level over the system lifetime for
each of the possible replacement strategies outlined. It
also calculates the average number of satellite failures
during the constellation lifetime over all of the
simulations. For those strategies which involve the
use of a launcher, (i.e. launch-on-demand and perhaps
the replacement for the overpopulated constellations),
the average number of launcher failures can be
estimated over all of the simulations. The launcher
failure rate depends on the launcher reliability.
If a very high level of operational availability is
required (e.g. 99.90% or more), spare satellites
already located in orbit will be preferred. On the
contrary, low level of requirements (e.g. less than
95%) will be compatible with a launch-on-demand
strategy. In between, spare satellites in parking orbits
will be preferred, and the number of spare orbital
planes will depend on the availability requirement and
on the altitude offset between the nominal and the
parking orbits.
In general, the system operational availability is a key
requirement for navigation and telecommunications
c nstellations, thus leading to spare strategies based
on in-orbit spares or spare satellites in parking orbits.
On the other hand, o spacecraft back-up policy is
generally envisioned for Earth observation
constellations: when a satellite is no longer operative,
there is no immediate replacement available. At best,
a new spacecraft may be launched to replace the dead
spac craft within approximately one year.
Study Case
In t  case of the Data Collection Mission, the
requirements for service availability and reliability
are compatible with a degraded service during a
reduced period of time following one or more satellite
failures. The acceptable duration of this period of
lower performance depends strongly on the mission
objectives and is a key factor to define the optimal
replacement strategies. The MTTR a failed satellite is
the parameter used to express the time constraints.
The mean performance level of the system has been
evaluated over a lifetime of five years, which is the
nominal lifetime of the Data Collection Constellation.
Based on the review of analogous missions and
satellite constellations, we have considered a satellite
reliability of 0.8 and 0.6 at the end of the system
lifetim . The satellite reliability at the end of the
sy tem lifetime has been used to parameterize the
performance level versus the MTTR.
Three replacement strategies have been taken into
account to accomplish this performance analysis:
· Launch on-demand
· Spare satellites in parking orbits
· In-orbit spare satellites.
The selection of a specific replacement strategy
determines the time required to replace a failed
satellite, and hence the achievable performance level
of the system.
Figure 4 presents the mean performance profile
versus the MTTR provided by the 24 satellites that
comprise the constellation. This figure displays the
system performance achieved implementing a launch
on-demand or placing the spares in parking orbits.
The higher the satellite reliability, the higher the
performance level of the system, because the failure
prob bility and the failure rate are lower. This holds
true independent of the specific replacement method
selected. In addition, it is evident that the effect of the
satellite reliability on the mean performance of the
system increases as the MTTR increases. This is due
to the higher failure probability associated with lower
satellite reliability.
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Figure 4: Mean Performance Level of the Data
Collection System versus MTTR
The MTTR being equal, the performance levels
provided by the launch-on-demand strategy and the
spares in parking orbits are practically the same. The
selection of the launch-on-demand strategy entails a
slightly worse performance because of the impact of
the launcher reliability: the performance level is not
only affected by the satellite failure rate, but also by
the launch failure rate. If the launch of a spare
satellite fails, a new launch must be arranged and
performed, with the consequent delay in the
replacement of the failed spacecraft. This negatively
affects the performance level of the system versus
time. A mean launcher reliability of 0.9 has been
assumed. This value is to be considered as a
reasonable estimation, since the determination of
reliability can be difficult or impossible for relatively
new or untested launch systems.
Besides the two replacement strategies presented in
Figure 4, in-orbit spare satellites have also been taken
into account. In this case, the MTTR is on the order of
few days (generally one or two). The corresponding
mean performance level of the system is:
- about 99.92% for a satellite reliability of 0.8,
- about 99.85%, for a satellite reliability of 0.6.
If a very high level of operational availability is
required, spare satellites already located in orbit will
be preferred, since this strategy allows maintaining a
high performance level thanks to a reduced MTTR.
The in-orbit spare strategy allows replacing quickly a
failed satellite for reasonable fuel consumption by
deploying at least one spare satellite per orbital plane.
The advantages of an in-orbit spare strategy should be
mitigated by the fact that it requires at least one
additional satellite per orbital plane, which may have
a strong impact on the launch and deployment of the
constellation. In the case of the 24-s/c constellation, a
minimum of six spare satellites (1/4 of the number of
the operational satellites) should be placed in orbit.
Unless the requirements for availability and reliability
of service are very demanding, other replacement
strategies should be investigated, as we cannot rule
out that they prove to be a better trade-off between
the number of spare satellites required and the
degradation of the service.
Lower performance levels and longer MTTR values
are compatible with a launch-on-demand strategy
and/or with spare satellites in intermediate parking
orbits. One point should be highlighted as regards
these replacement strategies. The set-up and launch to
replace a failed satellite imply a MTTR that is
generally longer than in the case of spare satellites in
parking orbits. This means that, even if the
performance profiles provided by these two strategies
are very similar, the MTTR is likely to be different,
which leads to different effective performance levels.
Actually, the agreement between the constellation
operators and the launcher providers dictates the real
conditions of launch availability and priority.
Therefore, the MTTR associated with a launch on-
demand may vary considerably according to the real
scenario taken into account.
From the evaluation of the replacement strategies
outlined, it emerges that the performance level
provided by spare s/c in parking orbits is rather good
if the MTTR can be kept to a low value (one/two
months). Thus, it is interesting to investigate this
strategy in more depth in order to assess its feasibility
and the potential advantages that it can offer.
Figure 5 shows the required circular drift orbit
altitude versus the MTTR for different numbers of
spare planes (assuming that the drift orbit is circular).
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Figure 5: Drift Orbit Altitude versus MTTR for the
Data Collection Mission
The mean time to replace a failed satellite is the sum
of the time needed for the nodes to coincide, and the
dur tion of the altitude-raising phase. The latter phase
brings a significant contribution to the overall MTTR
in case of electric propulsion, while almost negligible
in case of chemical propulsion. If we assume to use a
chemical propulsion system to perform the impulsive
or it maneuvers, the MTTR is a direct function of:
· the number of spare orbital planes, which
determines the maximum initial nodal angular
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difference between the orbital planes of the spare
and the failed satellites;
· the altitude of the spare orbit, which determines
the relative nodal drift rate between the orbital
planes of the spare and the failed satellites.
The initial angle between the orbital planes of the
spare and the failed satellites is uniformly distributed
between zero and the angular difference between two
consecutive spare planes (worst case corresponding to
the maximum drift duration). Thus, the time for the
nodes to coincide (the MTTR) is half this maximum
drift duration (the time spent on the spare orbit).
The selection of the number of spare planes is mainly
driven by two factors: the desired MTTR for a given
performance level and the number of spare satellites
to be injected into orbit. The more spare planes, the
lower the MTTR and the higher the number of
additional satellites to be deployed.
The cost of the propulsive maneuvers to perform the
transfer from the spare orbit to the operational orbit of
the constellation can be evaluated using Figure 1
(based on the assumption of using chemical
propulsion).
To complete the analysis of the replacement
strategies, GMV has estimated the average number of
satellite failures during the constellation lifetime. This
parameter depends directly on the satellite reliability
and on the system lifetime. The results obtained are
presented in Table 8. The satellite failures during the
constellation lifetime are expressed as percentages of
the number of satellites of the constellation.
Table 8: Statistics of Satellite Failures
System
lifetime
(years)
Satellite
reliability
Average percentage of
failures during the
constellation lifetime
5 0.6 39.2%
5 0.8 19.7%
These results are to be considered as global statistical
estimates, whose objective is to provide a
comprehensive indication of the system robustness.
Conclusions for the Replacement Strategy.
Of the three replacement strategies studied (in-orbit
spares, spares in a parking orbit, and launch-on-
demand), the best strategy from the point of view of
maintaining the constellation performance is always
going to be in-orbit spares. However, depending upon
the performance requirements of the constellation, in-
orbit spares may provide a higher than needed
constellation performance at a much higher monetary
cost. Concretely, if there are many orbital planes, this
presumes adding at least one additional on-orbit spare
satellite to each plane, which may entail many extra
satellites to be built and launched.
In some cases, the replacement strategies of spares in
parking orbits and launch-on-demand may become
very interesting. In particular, having spares in a
parking orbit is a viable replacement strategy when
the parking orbit is not very low in altitude, and hence
will not be overly affected by atmospheric drag.
Additionally, if the number of spare planes is high,
the time to replace a failed satellite is lower, and
therefore this strategy becomes more attractive.
However, with more spare planes, more satellites
need to be built and launched.
The launch-on-demand replacement strategy is
particularly useful when the constellation
performance requirements are not strict. This option
generally takes the most time in order to replace a
failed satellite. However, in the long run, it is usually
the cheapest. Additionally, it should be noted that the
amount of time it takes to replace a failed satellite
with this strategy depends upon the availability of
appropriate launchers. If no appropriate launchers are
immediately available, this strategy can take a long
time to replace a failed satellite. This strategy often
works very well as a back-up in combination with
either one of the two previous replacement strategies.
K eping in mind the advantages and the drawbacks of
each replacement strategy, the constellation operators
select the spare policy so as to comply with the
requirements in terms of system availability.
Constellation End-of-Life Policy
The concept of End-Of-Life (EOL) for a constellation
is somewhat different than the concept of end-of-life
for a single spacecraft. Typically, a single spacecraft
is used until the absolute very end of its functional
lifetime. This is typically until the absolute end of its
on-board fuel required for orbit maintenance, or until
the power source on the spacecraft fails, or all the on-
board instruments fail. This is not necessarily or even
generally true for spacecraft in constellations. Since
constellations usually depend on having all satellites
completely functional, if a spacecraft in a
constellation fails even partially and cannot be
completely revived, it may be replaced by a new
spacecraft, even if some functionality still remains.
In January 1998, the US Department of Defense
(DoD) came out with a disposal policy for DoD
spacecraft in all types of orbits9. In the future, US
DoD LEO spacecraft will all be positioned so as to
burn up on re-entry into the atmosphere within 25
years after the end of the operational lifetime. US
DoD GEO spacecraft will be maneuvered into a
graveyard orbit approximately 300 km above
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geostationary altitude at 36100 km. Of particular
interest was the first articulated graveyard orbit for
MEO spacecraft. The US DoD defined two broad
graveyard orbits for the disposal of MEO spacecraft.
MEO spacecraft may either be placed in circular
graveyard orbits of between 2000 km and 19700 km
in altitude, or between 20700 and 35300 km in
altitude. In addition, the US DoD has articulated a
policy of a graveyard orbit for its own GPS satellites
(semi-synchronous orbits at about 20000 km of
altitude). This graveyard orbit is between
approximately 500 km above semi-synchronous and
500 km below synchronous. It should be stressed
however, that this policy currently applies to only US
DoD satellites and is not an international standard.
The orbit altitude of the constellation (or the perigee
and apogee altitudes in case of constellation of
satellites in elliptical orbits) strongly affects the
identification of an effective EOL strategy. Also the
cost of the EOL strategy, in terms of the allocated fuel
budget, is mainly determined by the altitude band in
which the constellation is arranged.
End-of-Life Strategies for LEO Constellations
The orbital lifetimes of satellites passing through the
densely populated LEO band can be several
thousands of years for near circular orbits of high
mean altitude (up to 2000 km). Thus, it is imperative
to define a limitation of the orbital lifetime for
spacecraft arranged in LEO with large masses and
cross sections, so as to avoid the accumulation of
large objects and the further growth of small debris
due to explosions and collisions. An upper limit of 25
years for remaining orbit lifetimes after mission
completion is currently being discussed at
international level as a design guideline for operators
of satellites or constellations that cross the LEO band.
Such EOL policy can be implemented in future
designs by means of active de-orbiting into a direct or
delayed re-entry trajectory, or by taking advantage of
natural perturbations via properly selected EOL initial
orbit conditions.
As part of the active or natural orbit lifetime
reduction, various aspects need to be considered in
depth. First of all, the technical and economical
feasibility of active de-orbiting in terms of propellant
mass penalties and required attitude and orbit control
sub-system enhancements. Second of all, the resulting
residual risk on the ground due to spacecraft
fragments which could survive the re-entry phase.
The parameters that can be controlled to affect the
orbital lifetime of a satellite at the end of its
operational phase are the following:
- the DV required to perform a de-orbiting
maneuver into a direct re-entry trajectory or into a
self-decaying orbit with a reduced lifetime
- the deployment of drag augmentation devices or
the acquisition of a high drag attitude.
Controlled De-Orbiting Maneuver
I mediate de-orbiting at mission completion entails
carrying out a maneuver that leads to steep, controlled
re-entry and burn-up in the atmosphere, or to ground
i pact at a pre-assigned, safe location. The initiating
d -orbiting maneuver must be implemented such that
the resulting perigee altitude is sufficiently low to
enable the atmospheric capture of the spacecraft
ideally within one revolution. In any case, in order to
maintain control over the re-entry location, the time
between the de-orbiting maneuver and the final re-
entry should not exceed one to two orbits.
In order to initiate a controlled re-entry, a sufficient
large DV maneuver at apogee must be applied to
lower the perigee altitude well into the atmosphere.
The selection of the de-orbiting perigee altitude
depends on the mass-to-area ratio and on the drag
coefficient of the re-entering spacecraft. For non-
lifting bodies, a perigee altitude of about 60 km
ascertains a safe capture of the spacecraft in the lower
atmosphere, followed by an immediate, steep re-entry
with a well-controlled and relatively small impact for
the fragments that survive the deceleration and
heating. Heavy, compact spacecraft may require
lower perigee altitudes.
Figure 6 shows the DV required to perform a
controlled de-orbiting of a spacecraft from a near-
circular orbit of given initial altitude into a direct re-
entry orbit with a perigee height of 60 km. In Figure7
the equivalent propellant mass fraction is provided for
exhaust velocities of 2000 m/s (mono-propellant
hydrazine system of specific impulse Isp @ 220 s) and
3000 m/s (bi-propellant hydrazine / N2O4 system of
specific impulse Isp @ 310 s). The propellant mass
fra tion mp / m0 is related to the necessary DV b the
rock t equation:
                          mp / 0 = 1 – e 
-DV/Ve                       (2)
where:
mp / m0 = fuel mass fraction of the EOL s/c mass
DV = velocity impulse required for controlled direct
de-orbiting (m/s)
Ve = exhaust velocity of the spacecraft thrusters at
EOL (m/s).
In the case of the Data Collection Constellation, an
immediate de-orbiting maneuver from the
constellation nominal altitude (850 km) would entail a
DV of about 215 m/s and a mass fraction between
0.07 (Isp @ 220 s) and 0.1 (Isp @ 310 s).
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Figure 6:DV for a controlled de-orbiting of LEO s/c
Figure 7: Propellant mass fraction for controlled de-
orbiting of LEO spacecraft from near-circular orbits.
The very high DV and pointing requirements for an
immediate de-orbiting maneuver often exceed the
capabilities of a spacecraft after mission completion,
because they may be too expensive and technically
demanding to be implemented in the system design.
Uncontrolled De-Orbiting Maneuver
An uncontrolled de-orbiting of a satellite at the end of
its operational lifetime is initiated by one or several
short arc maneuvers at apogee passes (for mono- or
bi-propellant systems), or by an extended low-thrust
maneuver (in case of ionic thrusters). The objective is
to reduce the perigee altitude of the orbit and to cause
a decay and final re-entry within a limited time span.
In order to reduce the number of high mass LEO
objects with considerable cross sections, the
spacecraft and constellation operators seem to
converge to a commonly accepted lifetime limitation
of 25 years for the EOL disposal orbits of their LEO
missions8, 9. This EOL strategy is intended to narrow
down the risk of future explosions and collisions in
the LEO region, a risk that cannot be neglected
because of the catastrophic consequences it may have.
Following the de-orbiting of a spacecraft into a
reduced lifetime orbit, the altitude decay and the final
re-entry footprint will be determined by highly
variable aerodynamic drag forces. The uncertainties
in the orbit and attitude prediction are dominated by
the uncertainties in the atmospheric model, and in the
solar and geomagnetic activity forecasts. In
consequence, the re-entry time and location cannot be
predicted reliably until a few revolutions before the
final descent. An uncontrolled re-entry can occur
anywhere in a latitude band f £ ±i (where i is the
orbit inclination). To minimize the risk due to ground
impact of surviving fragments, the mission operators
should assess the consequences of the break-up and
incomplete burn-up of the spacecraft caused by
atmospheric friction. Typical break-up altitudes for
uncontrolled re-entries are around 80 km.
Figure 8 displays the propellant mass fraction
required to de-orbit a spacecraft from a given near-
circular orbit into a reduced lifetime orbit which will
re-enter within 25 years. This figure highlights the
dependence of the propellant mass fraction on the
efficiency of the propulsion system (expressed in
terms of the thruster exhaust velocity). Here 16000
m/s and 30000 m/s correspond to two different ion
thruster systems.
Figure 8 Propellant mass fraction for an uncontrolled
de-orbiting from a near-circular LEO orbit into an
eccentric orbit of reduced lifetime (< 25 years).
F r the Data Collection Mission, the mass fraction in
case of uncontrolled de-orbiting would be on the
order of 0.03-0.04, assuming a mono- or bi-propellant
propulsive system.
The uncontrolled de-orbiting EOL strategy entails a
DV requirement that is considerably lower that the
value determined for a controlled de-orbiting. Apart
from this advantage, it is to be noted that an
uncontrolled de-orbiting into reduced lifetime orbits
should be avoided in the case of hazardous payloads.
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Non-Propulsive Orbit Lifetime Reduction
The following non-propulsive procedures could be
applied to reduce the orbital lifetime of large
spacecraft after their mission completion (EOL).
· EOL orbit altitude. Leaving a satellite in a near-
circular orbit of low mean altitude (e.g. Hmean <
500 km), or in a highly eccentric orbit of very
low perigee altitude (e.g. Hpe < 200 km), will in
most cases result in a residual lifetime of less
than 25 years. The remaining time in orbit is
driven by air drag, which is directly proportional
to the area-to-mass ratio of the spacecraft, and to
the local air density (which mainly depends on
the solar activity in the course of the 11-year
solar cycle). For highly eccentric orbits, luni-solar
perturbations are key factors.
· EOL drag augmentation. Air drag and solar
radiation pressure forces are directly proportional
to the spacecraft’s area-to-mass ratio. The
effective cross section at EOL could be increased
by the inflation of a balloon-type structure, or by
the deployment of an umbrella-type light-weight
appendage with a large cross section. The
increased air drag directly reduces the orbital
lifetime. On highly eccentric orbits, solar
radiation pressure could furthermore assist in
lowering the perigee altitude, which entails a
corresponding increase of the drag perturbation.
· EOL orbit orientation. An optimized selection of
the orbital plane orientation at mission
completion proves to have a strong influence on
the residual lifetime of a satellite, particularly for
HEO and GTO orbits. Depending on the season
of the year, and the node position (RAAN), the
HEO or GTO perigee decreases or increases in
consequence of a periodic perturbation, whose
amplitude depends on the inclination of the
orbital plane and on the eccentricity of the orbit.
The amplitude of this perigee variation can range
over more than 100 km, and it can lead to an
atmospheric capture or even to an intersection
with the Earth ellipsoid, thus causing re-entry.
All non-propulsive lifetime reduction measures aim at
an accelerated conversion of orbital energy into heat
(air drag). The resulting orbit decay is gradual,
leading to a natural re-entry with little control of the
impact footprint.
End-of-Life Strategies for GEO and MEO
Constellations
Not all space missions allow carrying out an
immediate or delayed de-orbiting of spacecraft at the
end of their operational lifetime. Particularly satellites
located near the GEO orbit, or satellites in semi-
synchronous orbits (used by the GPS and the
GLONASS navigation and positioning constellations)
cannot be de-orbited. This is due to the unrealistic
requirements in terms of DV and fuel budget which
would be necessary for a direct, as well as for a
delayed de-orbiting maneuver after mission
completion.
In case of GEO satellites, a disposal orbit (also called
“graveyard orbit”) above the GEO ring has already
been used by many spacecraft operators, so as to
reduce the collision risk at the operational GEO
altitude. The altitude-raising phase should be to a
disposal orbit whose perigee altitude is at least DHGEO
km above the GEO ring. This minimum clearance
altitude increase has been agreed by the IADC8 (Inter-
Agency Debris Committee) Members, and it is
defined as:
       DHGEO = 235 + 1000*(Cr)max * (A / m)max         (3)
where:
DHGEO = minimum perigee altitude clearance above
GEO (km)
(Cr)max= maximum solar radiation pressure coefficient
(A/m)max = maximum area-to-mass ratio of the
satellite (m2/kg).
Cr can take values between 0 and 2. A realistic value
for GEO satellites would be 1£ Cr £2.
This recommended clearance is based on the analysis
of the long-term orbit evolution of a graveyard orbit
under the influence of gravitational forces (mainly
due to the Sun, the Moon and the oblate Earth), and of
solar radiation pressure forces. In order to make the
most efficient use of available fuel resources, the re-
orbiting to a disposal orbit should be performed via
multiple burns, based on the best fuel estimation, so
that the final orbit is near-circular and the propellant
mass is depleted. Subsequently, the spacecraft should
be switched off in a controlled manner, with
dissipation of all on-board energy sources (fuel,
pressure devices and batteries).
As a rule-of-thumb, a total velocity impulse of DV =
3.64 m/s is required for each circular orbit increase by
DH = 100 km (i.e., DV @ 11 m/s to achieve the
recommended altitude increase of DH > 300 km
above the GEO altitude).
The use of disposal orbits for other altitude bands has
not been recommended yet. The definition of an
internationally accepted policy for possible graveyard
orbits for MEO satellites is still an open issue.
Conclusions for the End-of-Life Policy
The issue of EOL strategies for constellations has
come to the fore following the recent development
and the expected surge of multi-satellite systems. It is
no longer possible to neglect the problems and the
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risks stemming from the considerable number of
orbiting spacecraft positioned in the most attractive
altitude bands. Consequently, an increasing interest in
the EOL policy has arisen at international level,
fostering the analysis of possible solutions.
The review of the possible constellation EOL policies
has pointed out that the driving factor in the selection
of a particular strategy is the satellite altitude. First of
all, the satellite altitude has a strong impact on the
determination of the relevant orbital perturbations that
affect the system. Eventually, these perturbations
could be used to de-orbit a LEO constellation, thus
assisting the EOL strategy implemented. Second of
all, the cost of the EOL maneuvers depends on the
EOL altitude of the satellites. This holds true both in
case of de-orbiting maneuvers to force the re-entry of
LEO spacecraft and in case of maneuvering GEO
satellites to graveyard orbits above the GEO altitude.
The effectiveness of an EOL strategy is the result of a
trade-off between the cost of the required maneuvers
and the collision risk mitigation obtained via the
selected EOL procedure. For LEO satellites, a
fundamental constraint is the residual lifetime after
the completion of the operational phase of the system.
An upper limit of 25 years for post-operation
lifetimes is currently being put forward as a design
guideline for operators of satellites or constellations
that cross the LEO band.
The analysis of the possible end-of-life strategies has
highlighted the need to define an internationally
accepted regulation as far as the EOL policy is
concerned. In addition, a big gap needs to be filled:
the definition of feasible and effective EOL strategies
for satellites arranged in the MEO altitude band.
Conclusions
The launch and set-up, the replacement of failed
satellites and the end-of-life policy are key steps in
constellation development. In order to outline a
general and effective approach to handle these phases,
GMV has accomplished a study of the fundamental
parameters affecting each step and has assessed their
impact on the system management plan.
The general concepts and trade-off results have been
tested taking into account a constellation of small
satellites and using in-house software tools and
algorithms. This has allowed pointing out some
interesting trends and controversial issues that
characterize the emerging satellite constellations.
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